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Dividend and Share Changes:
Is There a Financing Hierarchy?
ABSTRACT
The most widely accepted empirical dividend model is thatproposed by
Lintner, who argued that firms smooth dividends over time. Many theoretical
dividend models, however, either predict that dividends should be highly
variable, or at least offer no support for the smoothing hypothesis.We
use a switching regression model to test the Lintner model against an
alternative which allows dividend behavior to differ dependingupon whether
or not firms are issuing shares. We reject the Lintner model, finding no
evidence of dividend smoothing when firms are not issuing shares, anda high
negative dividend growth rate when firms are issuing shares. This
description of dividend behavior suggests the existence of a financing
hierarchy in that the marginal source of finance differs over time. To
further explore the financing hierarchy, we estimate logit models which
explain the decisions by firms to change dividends, and to issue or
repurchase shares. The results are consistent with the existence of a
financing hierarchy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There are two major puzzles about corporate dividend behavior, both of
which pertain simultaneously to the dividend decision on one hand, and the
equity issue/repurchase decision on the other:
1. Why do firms issue shares and pay dividends simultaneously?
2. Why do firms pay dividends in lieu of repurchasing shares?
Dividend income is taxed more heavily than capital gains income in the U.S.;
if investors and managers have symmetric information about the firm, this can
be shown to imply that firms should never simultaneously issue equity and pay
dividends; it also implies that, if possible, firms should repurchase shares
in lieu of paying dividends.1 Signalling models of dividends, such as those
by Bhattacharya [1979] and John and Williams [1985] predict the simultaneous
payment of dividends and issuance of equity, but present other theoretical
and empirical difficulties.2
While tax and signalling stories are frequently invoked to explain
corporate dividend behavior on a theoretical level, the most widely accepted
empirical dividend model is the Lintner [1956] model. Lintner argued (based
on survey evidence) that managers attempt to smooth dividends over time, with
the goal of reaching a target long-run payout ratio. Subsequently, Fama and
Babiak [1968] and Marsh and Merton [1985] estimated versions of the Lintner
model, and concluded that it is a reasonable description of dividend
behavior,3 without, however, testing the model against a sharply delineated
alternative hypothesis.
The central feature of the stylized Lintnerian description of dividend
behavior is that dividends depend on earnings in a manner which is2
independent of other firm decisions. By contrast, tax and signallingmodels
of dividends generally imply that dividend decisions should be determined
jointly with share issue and other financial decisions.
In this paper we test a version of the Lintner model against the
alternative hypothesis that dividend behavior is different when firms issue
shares and when they do not. We reject the Lintner model in favor of this
alternative; perhaps more surprisingly, we find no evidence that firms smooth
dividends during periods when they are not issuing equity. When firms do
issue equity, the dividend growth rate becomes sharply negative, lending
support to theories of capital structure which predict that firms will pay
lower dividends when they issue shares.
These results suggest the existence of a financing hierarchy, in which
dividends serve as the marginal source of finance for the firm when cash flow
is high relative to investments, while equity issues are the marginal source
of finance at other times. To further explore this idea, we also estimate a
model of the decisions to change dividends, and to issue and repurchase
shares, and find further support for the financing hierarchy hypothesis.
The specific plan of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we discuss
several tax and signalling models of dividends, and we argue that some of
them have implications different than the Lintner model. In section 3 we
discuss the data, which are drawn from a panel of firms obtained from the
Annual Compustat file.
In Sections 4 and S we then study empirically both the dividend and
share issue /repurchasedecision of firms. In particular, since theory
suggests that dividends and share issues should not be independent decisions,
in Section 4 we estimate a switching regression which has the traditional3
Lintner model as a special case. The regression allows coefficients to be
different when firms issue equity. We find that when firms are not issuing
equity, only lagged stock returns are a significant determinant of the change
in dividends, while when firms do issue equity, stock returns become
insignificant and the dividend growth rate becomes negative. Thus, dividend
behavior is both statistically and economically different than that predicted
by the Lintner model.
In Section 5, we estimate a multinomial logit model of the decision to
issue, repurchase, or leave unchanged the number of shares, and a separate
equation for increasing, decreasing, or leaving unchanged the dividend.4 The
empirical results show that corporate dividend and share decisions are
broadly consistent with the following description of corporate financial
behavior: profitable firms on the margin use dividends and debt assources
of finance, and the least profitable firms use equity issues asa last resort
form of financing. This description is reminiscent of Myers's [1984]
financing hierarchy, in which firms prefer internal to external finance, and
debt to equity finance.
Section 6 concludes. There are two appendices. In one appendix we
formalize the intuition about the behavior of a model in which equity issues
are a last resort form of financing by analyzing a simple tax-based, dynamic
financial policy model similar to that in Auerbach [1984]. Despite the
simple structure of the model, the desire to avoid equity issues (which are
costly for tax reasons) generates relatively rich behavior. The other
appendix derives the coefficient standard errors for the switching regression
model.
This paper is related to previous empirical studies both of debt-equity4
ratios and dividend policy. The paper closest in spirit to ours is Kalay and
Shimrat [1985], who look at the behavior of dividends and earnings of firms
which issue equity. They find evidence that, even though dividends are
positive when firms issue equity, payout ratios and dividends are low for
equity-issuing firms. This is similar to our result in Section 4 that,
controlling for other determinants of dividends, the dividend growth rate is
negative when firms issue equity.Other related dividend papers are
Anderson [1985], Fama and Babiak [1968], and Marsh and Merton [1985].
There have been numerous empirical studies of debt-equity ratios;5 most
have either estimated a partial adjustment model of the debt-equity ratio
(and possibly other financial ratios as well) or used a classificatory
statistical method to group firms by debt-equity ratios. Most of the
classificatory studies have studied the decision to issue one kind of
security vs another, but have not considered the decision between issuing and
not issuing as we do.6 Also, although other papers have looked at the
decision to issue equity, to our knowledge no one else has examined the stock
repurchase decision in this kind offramework.7
The empirical tests in this paper focus on changes in financial policy
rather than levels. Intuitively, active capital structure decisions made by
management should be more revealing of managerial intentions than the passive
changes that result from debt reaching maturity or the stock pricechanging.8
For example, if the stock price rises and the debt to equity ratio thereby
falls, the reason for the rise in the stock price may affect management's
decision to issue additional debt or repurchase shares. Management may
respond differently if a rise in the stock price reflects future growth
opportunitiesasopposed to an increase in the market value of assets inS
place. By studying active financial policy changes, there is a greater
chance of uncovering the decision variables used by financial managers.
2. THEORIES OF DIVIDEND AND SHARE POLICY
In this section we will briefly review the implications of some
financial policy models, with the goal of understanding their empirical
predictions about dividends and share policy. This review is meant to be
suggestive, not exhaustive. The idea that there is a financing hierarchy,
i.e. that at different times different sources of finance will be the
marginal source of finance for the firm, is frequently present in dynamic
models of capital structure, so we will use it as an organizing principle in
the discussion. Unfortunately, while theoretical models are useful in
thinking about capital structure issues, there exists no unified,
comprehensive, testable model of financial policy. In addition, there are
even different versions of the financing hierarchy story, based on taxes,
information considerations, and agency considerations.
For many years, thinking about capital structure decisions was
dominated by what Myers [1984) has termed "static" capital s.ructure models.
In this view of capital structure, the firm trades off a fixed cost of debt
finance, such as bankruptcy cost, against the tax benefit of paying interest,
and there is a fixed target capital structure.In these models the firm is
like a balloon, for which all features become proportionally larger as the
balloon is blown up. The marginal source of finance is implicitly taken to
be the weighted average of its existing capital structure. Empirical work
based on these models relies on the implication that there is a unique target
capital structure (such as a desired dividend payout or debt-equity ratio)6
towards which managers aim.9 It is implicit that changes in exogenous
variables (such as the operating risk of the firm) will change the optimal
capital structure, but there is no model of the adju.tment process.
Myers [1984] has argued that these static models fail to explain many
stylized (but largely undocumented) facts about corporate financing, which
are better accounted for by dynamic capital structure models. One stylized
fact is the existence of a so-called "financing hierarchy": firms appear to
have lexicographic preferences for sources of financing, such as preferring
internal to external finance and, once external finance is required, debt
finance over equity finance.
The general notion that there is a financing hierarchy, i.e. that there
are different costs associated with different forms of financing, generates a
rich model of financial policy. For example, if equity issues are a last
resort, managers will follow policies which minimize the chance of a future
equity issue, such as retaining earnings (investing in marketable securities)
and reducing debt outstanding)°'11 The models of financial policy which we
will discuss all imply that equity issues are a last resort form of
financing.
Tax models (see, e.g. Auerbach [1984]) predict that equity issues are a
financing source of last resort for tax reasons. A tax-based financial
policy model is sketched in Appendix A. If the dividend tax rate exceeds the
capital gains tax rate, cash inside the firm (which necessarily bears the
dividend tax) is cheaper than cash outside the firm.'2 This implies that7
firms will attempt to reduce the chance of future equity issues, which can be
accomplished with a reduction in current dividends or a reduction in current
debt outstanding (thus preserving debt capacity for the future). When future
equity issues are unlikely, firms can issue debt to the extent of debt
capacity to take advantage of the tax advantage to debt.
This model has clear implications for dividend behavior. If future
equity issues are likely, dividends will be set at a low level and hence they
will be insensitive to earnings fluctuations. On the other hand, firms which
are not likely to issue equity will use dividends as the marginal source of
finance, and dividends will vary with current cash flow. Thus, profitable
firms issue debt and use dividends as a marginal source of finance. Less
profitable firms cut dividends, reduce debt (to minimize the chance of a
future equity issue), and if faced with a current equity issue, cut dividends
to zero and raise additional debt before issuing equity. Notice that the
Lintner description of dividends is not supported by this model, since high
cash flow firms will make no effort to smooth dividends. Low cash flow firms
will pay non-varying and hence tismoothedit dividends.
The dividend signalling models of Bhattacharya [1978] and John and
Williams [1985] also predict that equity issues are a financing source of
last resort, but these models make different predictions about dividends.
For example, John and Williams [1985] predict that firms will pay dividends
only when issuing equity, i.e. when cash flows are low. High cash flow firms
repurchase shares instead of paying dividends. This prediction of a strong
negative relation between dividends and cash flow clearly contradicts the
Lintner model as well as both casual empiricism and the more formal
empiricism in Section 4. The model in Bhattacharya [1979] also predicts that8
firms will be observed to pay dividends and issue equity simultaneously, with
an ambiguous relationship between the size of the dividend and the frequency
of equity issues.13 The Bhattacharya model is possibly consistent with the
Lintner model, in that dividend policy may be independent of share issues.
Finally, Myers and Majiuf [1984), in an application of the lemons model,
also predict that firms will avoid share issues. As with the tax model,
firms accumulate "financial slack" (investments in liquid assets) in
preference to paying out dividends when the chance of an equity issue is
high. Equity is issued only after debt capacity is exhausted. •Although the
model is not explicit about dividends, it appears likely that firms for which
future equity issues are unlikely and which lacked non-negative NPV projects
would make net payouts to shareholders.
Thus, recent capital structure models reach varying predictions about
the relationship between dividends and equity issues; some are at odds with
the Lintner model (the tax story and the John-Williams signalling story),
while others (Bhattacharya) are possibly consistent with it.
The signalling models discussed do not include debt and thus do not make
predictions about the debt-equity choice. The tax and Myers-Majluf models
generate similar predictions about external financing, in that profitable
firms use payments to share holders as the marginal source of finance, while
unprofitable firms reduce these payments, issue debt, and issue equity as a
last resort.
3. THE DATA
The Sample: The sample of firms was drawn from the 1984 Compustat
Industrial data file, covering 1965-1984.Weexcluded a firm if:9
1.The firm was primarily engaged in the banking or insurance
industry, or was a public utility.
2. The firm had missing data for key variables between 1965 and 1984.
3. Thefiscalyear was not constant between 1971 and 1984.
4. The stock price data needed to compute fiscal year stock returns
for non-December fiscal year firms was not available on CRSP for
this period.
The resulting sample contained 423 firms, with data for 1971 to 1984. The
cutoff at 1971 was necessary because we used the accounting statement of
changes to infer capital structure changes, and the vast majority of firms
only began reporting these numbers in 1971. Table 1 provides a listing of
the number of sample firms in each two-digit SIC code classification. For
most of our estimation procedures computer memory limitations14 prevented
using the full 14 years and 423 firms. Zecause of this we sorted the firms
alphabetically and used the data for the first 287 firms (4018 observations
in all) when we needed to truncate the sample.
To locate possible equity issues we screened the data items Sales and
Purchases of Common and Prefe:red Stock (from the statement of changes
categories in the Compustat file) to determine when firms neither issued nor
repurchased shares. Unfortunately, a variety of different transactions can
generate positive entries in these Conipustat data items. Among these are
primary equity issues (both common and preferred), warrant issues, debt-
equity swaps, exercises of executive stock options and warrants, and
acquisition-related transactions. As a further preliminary screen, we
required that the reported equity issue be at least 3% of the firm's market
value of equity the previous year. For every observation which passed this10
screen, we checked the annual report for the description of the transaction.
We excluded reported equity issues due to executive stock options and
warrant exercises on the grounds that these represented equity issues beyond
the firm's control, or in the case of executive options, issues occurring for
fundamentally reasons fundamentally different than the reasons for ordinary
stock issues. We noted which were swaps, but they are not automatically
excluded.
The variables used in the estimation are described in Table 1.
One implication of the models discussed in Section 2 is that the optimal
choice of debt and dividends will vary over time for a given firm. As a way
of evaluating the proposition that financial policies are static over time,
Table 3 provides measures of how financial policies vary across time for the
individual firms in our sample.15 All variables are defined in Table 2.
Columns 1 through 4 display the average across firms of the range across time
for each firm, for each of seven financial variables. For the average firm,
the debt-to-market-value ratio varies by .26 over the 14 years. The next row
shows that the variation in the ratio of debt to the book value of assets is
almost as large, whic demonstrates that the large amount of variation in the
debt to market value ratio is not due to changes in the market value of
equity. The dividend yield on average varies by 5.5 percentage points for a
given firm. That this is not due solely to changes in the market value of
equity is demonstrated in the next row, which displays the statistics for
dividends per share divided by the average equity price over the 14 years.
(Dividing by average price adjusts for differences in the number of shares
per dollar of assets.)
Finally, the last three rows show that the amount of external financing11
undertaken (as reported in the statement of changes) is also quite variable.
This is not surnrising for changes in equity, which are rare events, but the
deviation over time in the amount of debt financing (as a percent of total
market value) is 20% of the market value of the firm, which is substantial.
It seems clear that there is substantial variation over time and across firms
in both patterns of financing and levels of various financial ratios.
Figures 1 and 2 depict the pattern of changes in dividends and shares
which occur in our sample. Figure la shows that with but two exceptions
(1971 and 1972) well over 50% of the firms in the sample change their
dividend in any given year. Of the firms that change dividends, the vast
majority raise them. On average only about 10% of the sample lowers
dividends in any given year. Figure lb shows that slightly under half of the
firms in the sample did not lower their dividends once during the l4year
period. About 20 firms did not change dividends at all during this period.
The modal number of years for a firm to not change dividends is two.
Dividend changes seem fairly well distributed across firms.
As expected, equity changes are considerably rarer. Figure 2a shows
that never do more than 20% of the firms report issues in a given year and
repurchases are rarer still. From Figure 2b, 60% of firms show no repurchase
activity during the whole period, and 30% never issue shares. Of those firms
that do issue or repurchase, few do so more than twice during the period. If
there appear to be too many share issues in Figure 2 (compare our numbers to
the result in Kalay and Shimrat [1986] that the average unregulated firm
issues equity once every fifty years), it should be kept in mind that the
data include shares issued in mergers and acquisitions, and issues of
preferred stock.12
4. A DIRECT TEST OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVIDENDS AND EQUITY
In this section we address the financing hierarchy question directly by
examining the dividend policy of firms which are issuing equity. We estimate
a model of dividend changes in the spirit of Fama and Babiak and Marsh and
Merton, and ask whether the regression equation explaining dividends changes
depends upon the equity policy the firm is pursuing. If equity is a last
resort, then we should observe a decline in the dividend growth rate when
shares are issued. We test the Lintner model by estimating a switching
regression model with endogenous switching as in Lee and Trost [1978].
A. The Statistical Model
The model is specified as follows. Suppose there are two "regimes" for
a firm. The current regime is determined by an endogenous variable, which we
observe to be either zero or one, and which is a function of a set of
variables Z:
(1) I Z-y -u,
and that in regime i dividend policy obeys the equation
(2) iD-X13i+c. ilifZ-y>u
2 if Z-y <u.
where X is a vector of explanatory variables. Inourmodel, I represents the
currentequity policy of thefirm, i.e. whether the firm is issuing or13
repurchasing shares. The firm is in regime 1 if I >0(issuing shares) and
in regime 2 if I <0(repurchase or no change in shares). Assume that u,
and are jointly normally distributed, and let and denote the
cumulative normal density and the normal density. We will write and
as shorthand for t(Z-y) prob(u < Z-y) —prob(regime1) and (Z7) =the
standard normal density evaluated at Z-y.Then, following Lee and Trost,
(3) E(tD) —
(X131
+E( u < Z-y ))Prob(u< Z-y)
+ (X82 ÷ E( c2u ￿ Z-y)) Prob(u Z-y)
Using standard results on the truncated normal distribution,16 this can be
rewritten
E(D) —
(X191alu' 'Z' + (X2 + a2u (1)) (1-)
—
X$2
+ - + 2u -lu
or
(4) —X+ cx(- + '2u -0iu)
+ ?7.
A A
(4) can be estimated using OLS, with estimates and used in place of
the true and ,whichare unknown. We will discuss in a moment where
these estimates come from. Let Y denote a dummy variable which equals one in
A
regime 1 and 0 in regime 2.It is possible to show that if the estimated
and are used, then the error term, r, has the form14
(5) -+ (1-Y)2+(Y- -+ ( - -
+ -2u
-
Itis clear from examining the error term that the usual OLS standard errors
will be incorrect. There are two reasons for this: first, because of the
first three terms, the true error is conditionally heteroskedastic; second,
the last two terms show that there is additional noise in the estimation
A A
processbecause and are estimated, instead of known a priori. Lee,
Maddala, and Trost [1978] show how to construct the correct covariance matrix
for the estimated coefficients; we present the derivation in Appendix B.
Whyisthe switching regression necessary? If the event determining the
switch (equity issues in this case) was exogenously determined (say by
sunspots) then one could estimate (6) with dummy variable interaction terms,
where the dummy would indicate whether or not the exogenous event occurred,
and hence would indicate the regime. Equity issues are not exogenous,
however, but are simultaneously determined with dividends, so that a dummy
variablefor equity issues as an explanatory variable would lead to
simultaneous equations bias. The two-stage procedure used here is analogous
A
toordinary two-stage least squares, and Zis like the fitted right-hand
side variable. Estimation of the switching regression (4) is performed in
three steps:
A
1.Obtain an estimateof-y.We are interested in the dichotomous
event u >Z-yor u <Z-y.Thus, -y can be estimated using maximum likelihood
probit on equation (1). Given this estimate of -y, construct and .
2.Run OLS on equation (4) using the estimated and
3. Using the knownformof the errors (equation (5)),constructthe15
estimated covariance matrix for the errors, 0, and compute the coefficient
variances as (W'W)W'c2W(W'W)1, where W' is the matrix [X' PX' F'] (the
A A
matrixof regressors in (5)), with P —diag[]and F —diag[4].Appendix B
describes computation of the covariance.
B. Results
The dividend model we estimate is based upon the Lintner model as
estimated by Fama and Babiak [1968] and Marsh and Merton [1985]:
(6) D — + + 482E1+3r1
where D are dividends, E are earnings per share, and r is the rate of return
on the firm's stock. The inclusion of the lagged stock return as an
explanatory variable was inspired by Marsh and Merton [1985], who argue that
share price changes should provide information about future earnings and
hence about future dividends. D, D, and E were divided by the lagged stock
price in order to reduce heteroskedasticity. The OLS estimates for this
equation and for the equation estimated by Fama and Babiak are presented in
Table 4. The signs of the coefficients are the same as in Fama and Babiak,
but the magnitudes of the coefficients are different. In particular, Fama
and Babiak find greater (in absolute value) average coefficients on lagged
dividends, and on earnings. The especially low earnings coefficient is
partly due to the inclusion of lagged returns; it increases to .03 when
lagged returns are excluded.17To check that the data pooling was not
skewing the results we also ran the exact Fama-Babiak equation both as a
pooled time-series cross section with a fixed effects estimator and we also16
ran 287 firm-specific regressions and averaged the coefficients. We
continued to get coefficients comparable to those in Table 4. We conclude
that the behavior in our sample is different than that in Fama and
Babiak's.18 In order to estimate the switching regression we first
estimated a probit equation explaining equity issues. This entails assigning
zero to observations for which there is no equity issue, and a one to
observations with an equity issue. The Probit estimation procedure is then a
maximum likelihood estimate of the probability of an equity issue,
conditional on the explanatory variables. As explanatory variables we used
the variables in the dividend equation (lagged earnings, dividends, and stock
return) and also the lagged debt-to-value ratio, and a measure of the
standard deviation of the change in earnings.
The probit regression is binomial because our interest was in comparing
equity issues to all other possibilities, and also because a trinomial
switching model would be considerably more difficult to estimate. The
appropriate treatment of swaps is ambiguous since they do not represent net
external financing. Consequently, we report results both including and
excluding swaps as equity issues. Since the results are similar, we will
only discuss the estimates including swaps as equity issues.
The results of the first stage probit regressions are in Table 5. The
probit results show that firms which issue equity have low earnings per
share, low dividends (though this result is not statistically significant), a
high ratio of debt to market value, and high stock returns over the previous
year.
For the second-stage regressions we estimate the dividend equation (6),
with allowance for the switch as in (4). The results are in Table 6. At the17
bottom of each column we report the chi-squared statistic from performing a
Jald test for the joint significance of the switching variables. The
statistic is significant (at greater than p —.005)in both cases, sharply
rejecting the hypothesis that the coefficients in the dividend equation do
not change when firms issue equity. This amounts to a rejection of the
Lintner model. The first four rows in Table 6 report the coefficients in the
non-equity issue regime. For purposes of comparison, these should be
compared to the unconditional estimates of equation (6) reported in Table 4.
The coefficient on the lagged dividend is zero, suggesting that dividends
follow a random walk (conditional on other explanatory variables) during
times when the firm is not issuing equity. It appears that when firms are
not issuing equity, dividend changes are determined primarily by the lagged
stock return. If the stock return reflects changes in permanent earnings,
then this is consistent with our version of the hierarchy model, which
predicts that when firms are unlikely to issue equity, dividend changes will
reflect changes in earnings.
The interaction coefficients (those multiplied by )representthe
change in the estimated coefficients due to the switch in regimes. The
coefficients in the equity issue regime are obtained by adding the
interaction coefficient to the non-interaction coefficient. The two
significant variables are lagged dividends and the lagged stock return. The
dividend growth rate becomes dramatically negative when firms issue equity,
meaning that conditional on being in the equity-issue regime, the greater
last period's dividend, the greater the decline in this period's dividend.
Although the coefficient on the lagged stock return changes significantly
between the two regimes, the coefficient is insignificantly different from18
zero (t-statistic =1.69)in the equity issue regime. The negative dividend
growth rate is evidence against the importance of the casual empirical
observation that dividends sometimes rise when shares are issued. The
results suggest that at the least dividends rise by less than they would have
had firms not been issuing equity. The results in this section support the
hierarchy story, and call into serious question the dividend smoothing story.
5. LOGIT ESTIMATES FOR SHARE AND DIVIDEND CHANGES
The evidence in the previous section suggested that there are periods
when dividends are the marginal source of finance and periods when equity
issues are the marginal source of finance. In this section we develop
additional indirect evidence on the financing hierarchy by estimating a logit
model of the dividend change and share issue/repurchase decision. We view
the analysis in this section as primarily descriptive, rather than as a test
against the null hypothesis implied by a particular model.
Since equity issues and repurchases and dividend changes are discrete
events it is natural to analyze them using a discrete choice model. This
effectively entails grouping the observations and using the exogenous
variables to explain the assignments of observations to groups. For example,
in studying equity issues and repurchases, we create a dummy variable which
has one value if the firm issues equity, a different value if the firm
repurchases equity, and a third value if there is no issue or repurchase.
The statistical procedure is then as follows: if d.. is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if ith observation consisted of observing event j, and if the
events are independent, the likelihood function for a three-choice discrete
choice model is19




The specification is completed by specifying a distribution for the
probabilities, P ,asa function of exogenous variables. The two commonly
used alternatives are the normal distribution, in which case (1) specifies a
multinoniial probit model, and the logistic distribution, in which case (1)
specifies a multinomial logit model. For the binomial case, the two give
similar results (Maddala [1983]). With additional alternatives, however, the
probit model quickly gains computational complexity, while the logit is
tractable. Consequently, we estimate the trinomial alternatives in this
section using logit. In the case of a multinomial logit model with n









is the vector of observations on independent variables, and 3
is the vector of coefficients. From (8), the logit coefficient, 3 ,isthe
derivative of the log-odds ratio, ln(P./(1-P.)), with respect to the
exogenous variable. Thus, the elasticity of the log-odds ratio with respect
to the exogenous variable is 9x. In each case the alternatives are compared
to a base alternative. "No change in financial policy" is the base20
alternative. We use the same set of explanatory variables in the equity and
dividend change equations, which can be thought of as reduced form equations.
We do not impose any cross-equation restrictions.
A. Explanatory Variables
In this section we discuss the statistical model and motivate the choice
of explanatory variables. As mentioned earlier, our goal in this section is
not to test one specific theory of financial policy against another, since
every leading theory has obvious deficiencies. Nevertheless, our general
guide is the version of the financing hierarchy which says that dividends are
the marginal source of finance for high cash flow firms, with debt issues
following and then equity issues as a last resort. For individual
explanatory variables the null hypothesis is that the variables do not have
the effect predicted by this theory. We selected explanatory variables
suggested by the hierarchy hypothesis, and by different theories of debt
cost.
Following are the explanatory variables (variable definitions are in
Table 1) used in the logit regressions:
Dividend Yield (lagged): the hierarchy model discussed in Section 2
suggests that a firm will pay high dividends if a future equity issue is
unlikely, i.e. if the firm is profitable relative to future investment
opportunities. In this case dividends are the marginal source of finance and
will be more responsive to changes in earnings. Thus, the modelpredicts
that the level of dividends will be positively associated with the
probability of a change in dividends and negatively associated with the
probability of an equity issue (since the prospect of a future equity issue21
will induce lower dividends today).
Stock Return (lag: it is well known from other studies (e.g.
Taggart [1977], Marsh [1982], and Asquith and Mullins [1986]) that equity
issues are preceded by large positive excess stock returns, though the reason
for this is not understood, and this is not predicted by any of the models we
have discussed. To the extent that high stock returns reflect an increase in
future expected earnings, stock returns should be positively related to
dividends since higher future earnings imply a lower probability of a future
equity issue. This is not an unambiguous relationship, however, since high
stock returns can also reflect improved investment opportunities which,
holding fixed expected earnings, could increase the chance of a future share
issue. Thus, theory provides no clear prediction for this variable.
Debt/Market Value of Firm (lazged: There are two effects at work:
profitable firms which expect to become unprofitable have an incentive to
reduce the chance of a future equity issue and hence to reduce debt; at the
same time, firms which issue equity will have exhausted other financing
sources first, and thus should have greater debt. In the hierarchy model
there is an ambiguous relation between debt and dividends, because a
profitable firm can be highly levered, and simultaneously paying high
dividends, or an unprofitable firm can be highly levered and on the verge of
an equity issue. Consequently, we include an interaction term between debt
and earnings, which should be positive: given a level of debt, greater
earnings suggest a smaller probability of an equity issue and higher earnings
suggest higher dividends.
ODerating Income/Market Value (lagged): this is a measure of cash flow.
Other things equal, if cash flows are positively serially correlated, firms22
with more cash flow should be less likely to issue equity and more likely to
increase dividends.
Market Value (lagged): the log of the firm's market value. It can be
argued that large firms are more widely held, more closely monitored, more
mature, and better understood by potential security holders, so that external
financing is less costly. As such, one might expect large firms to be more
likely to issue equity in informational models such as John and Williams
[1985], Miller and Rock [1985], and Myers and Majluf [1984].
Market Value of Firm/Book Value of Assets (lagged): this is included as
a proxy, albeit an imperfect one, for the "growth opportunities" in Myers
[1977]. Firms with higher growth opportunities will have a lower debt
capacity. In the absence of a formal model it is unclear how this should
affect equity issues, since the firm can adjust both dividends and debt to
affect the probability of an equity issue. The effect on dividends is
likewise unclear.
Standard Deviation of f(Chanzes in Oterating Incorne)/Assetsl: it is
difficult to say how this measure of risk should affect the probability of
changes in dividends and shares, largely because those are endogenous
decisions, the probability of which can be affected by other decisions. For
example, firms with more variable operating income may issue less debt and
therefore have less resort to external equity issues. The hierarchy story
suggests that firms with more variable operating income should on average
have more variable dividends.
B. Results
Maximum likelihood estimates of the logit model for changes in dividends23
and equity are presented in Table 7a and 8a. Tables 7b and 8b report the
elasticity of the log-odds ratio with respect to the exogenous variables;
this is a way of interpreting the coefficients. This elasticity is evaluated
at the unconditional mean of the exogenous variable. Also reported is the
percentage change in the exogenous variable representing a one standard
deviation move. Thus, the table reports both the elasticity and a measure of
the magnitude of a plausible move in the variable. Both equations perform
much as predicted.
Dividends. Many of the results in Table 7 are familiar from the work of
Fama and Babiak [1968] and Marsh and Merton [l985a]. Dividends move in
tandem with lagged earnings and the lagged stock risk premium, in the sense
that higher earnings and stock returns increase the probability of a dividend
increase and reduce the probability of a decrease. Both of these are
consistent with the financing hierarchy story in this paper and with the
Lintner model. The novel result in Table 7 is the positive coefficient on
the lagged dividend yield for both increases and decreases in dividends.
Thus, if the dividend yield is high, the dividend is least likely to remain
unchanged; the higher the dividend yield, the likelier the firm is to either
raise or lower dividends. This is predicted by the financing hierarchy
story, since a high dividend yield is a sign that management considers
dividends to be the marginal source of finance. The fact that dividends
exhibit more volatility when the dividend yield is high confirms this
prediction.
The financing hierarchy story predicts that firms with a high debt ratio
and lower earnings should be firms which are less likely to have dividends as
a marginal source of finance. Firms with high debt ratios and high earnings24
should be likelier to have dividends as the marginal source of finance. The
cocfficient lends support to this interpretation, since a high debt ratio
means an increase in the probability of a decrease in dividends and a reduced
probability of an increase. At the same time, firms with high debt and high
earnings (the interaction term) have an increased probability of an increase
in dividends. Firms with a high standard deviation of earnings are more
likely to lower and less likely to raise dividends. Large firms change
dividends more frequently than small firms; this may be due to dividend
changes conveying less information about large (and presumably well-
scrutinized) firms.
Equity.When interpreting Table 8, it is important to bear in mind
that we have no theory governing repurchases, and we know of no comparable
estimated repurchase equation. The equity equations display the result
obtained by Taggart [1977], Marsh [1982] and Asquith and Mullins [1986] that
an increase in the stock price precedes a share issue. An increase in the
stock price has no effect on the probability of a repurchase. The
coefficients on earnings show that lower earnings increase the probability of
a share issue, and higher earnings increase the probability of a repurchase
(though this coefficient is not significantly different from zero). Both
results are sensible.
Finally, a high debt ratio is associated with a greater probability of
an equity issue and a smaller (but statistically insignificant) probability
of a repurchase. The hierarchy theory might suggest that repurchases are
less likely with a high debt ratio (shareholders wish to lower the
probability of a future issue), and it would also predict that issues are
more likely.25
6. CONCLUSION
The capital structure decisions of firms are not well understood. We
argued in this paper that interactions between different facets of financial
policy are important, and we demonstrated this by showing empirically that
the dividend decision and share issue decisions cannot be considered in
isolation from other financing decisions. In particular, we have shown that
when firms are not issuing equity, dividends depend only on lagged stock
returns and hence are not smoothed. When firms are issuing equity, the
dividend growth rate becomes negative, and dividends are "smoothed."
We also estimated regressions explaining dividend changes and the share
issue/repurchase decision. The results appear to be consistent with a
version of the financing hierarchy theory, i.e. that firms which have high
free cash flow use dividends as the marginal source of finance. Firms with
low free cash flow undertake financial policies which minimize the chance oof
a future equity issue.
Many puzzles remain. Although we presented evidence that dividends are
not smoothed when firms are not issuing equity, it is still true that the
typical firm changes dividends only once every 1.5 to 2 years,19 and we have
no explanation for this. The logit equations performed least well (in the
sense of having few significant explanatory variables) for share repurchases.
There is also no satisfactory theory explaining the repurchase vs dividend
decision.
It appears that better understanding of the correlations among financial
policies would permit better-posed theoretical questions. Most of the
"stylized facts" in corporate finance deal with share price reactions to26
events; it would be useful to have stylized facts describing the behavior of
financial choice variables across firms and over time. One goal of this
paper was to improve our understanding of dividend and share issue and
repurchase behavior in this way.27
APPENDIX A: A Tax-Based Financing Hierarchy Model
In this Appendix we present an illustrative tax-based financial policy
model which illustrates how avoidance of equity issues can generate
interesting financial behavior. We use a simple tax model with uncertainty
but without bankruptcy similar to that in Auerbach [1984]. For simplicity we
A
will assume that the firm has a fixed debt capacity, B, and that share
repurchases are prohibited. In addition, we take investment policy as fixed,
so the choice is purely over financial variables. Given the appropriate tax
rate assumptions, the model generates equity financing as a financing source
of last resort.
Assume that
i. Investors are risk-neutral.
ii. The firm maximizes the value of the equity.
iii. Firms cannot pay negative dividends and there are no share
repurchases (any fixed limit will do as well).
Let
X(t) —After-taxcash flow,
B(t) —debtissued in period t,
r(t)—couponrate on the debt issued at t,
N(t)—newissues of equity at t,
V(t)—marketvalue of the equity at t,
D(t)—dividendat t,
—one-perioddiscount factor
u —personaltax rate on dividend income,
ipersonal tax rate on interest income,
rcorporatetax rate, and28
C—taxrate on capital gains income.





Assumption iv is the analogue to the Miller [1977) condition for there
to be a tax advantage to debt. It ensures that the corporate tax deduction
for interest (after personal taxes) is greater than the personal taxation of
debt income (Auerbach [1979]). Firms will issue at least some debt if the
condition holds. Note that the capital gains tax rate takes the place of the
"equity tax rate" in the usual statement of the Miller condition: the
dividend tax rate does not appear at all (Auerbach [1979]).
Assumption v says that dividends are taxed more heavily than capital
gains. Assumption vi says that the tax advantage to debt, multiplied by the
rate of time preference, is small relative to the tax disadvantage of
dividends. Assumption vi gives the condition ensuring that if equity issues
are likely in the near future, the firm will invest in debt in lieu of
issuing dividends.
At time t,equity-holderschoose the debt issue, B(t), the dividend,
D(t),andnew equity issues N(t) to maximize









where denotes the expectation conditional on time t, and the cash flow
constraint, conditional upon the firm remaining solvent, is given by
(A.2) D(t) —X(l-r)+B(t)+N(t)-B(t-l)(l-i-(l-r)r(t-l))
Since wehave assumed that there is no bankruptcy, bondholders earn the
after-tax rate of discount, grossed up by one minus their tax rate:
(A.3) r -(fl1 - l)/(l-i).
Denote the constrained maximand as L:
(A.4) L(t) -V(t)+AD(t)+p(B(t)
-B(t))÷ vN(t).







Since the first two terms are negative, it is immediate that if new share
issues are positive, then Lit— 0and At —1-(1-u)/(1-c)> 0 ,i.e.
dividends will be zero. Similarly, if dividends are positive then At =0
and —1-(l-u)/(l-c)>0,sothat shares will not be issued. Thus, if
8c < u, firms will never issue equity and pay dividends at the same time. To
do so would result in a net current loss of (flc -u)/(l
-c)per dollar of
dividends paid.
The first order condition for optimal debt finance is








Using (2) and (3), and the fact that A —1-(l-u)/(1-/3c)when binding,
equation(6) can be rewritten as31







-lj ) - (u-flc)JESt+i(B(t)) + -
Wehave written as a function of 8(t) to emphasize that whether or
not dividends are paid next period depends in part upon the choice of debt
today: for any given level of earnings at t÷l ,thefirm will likelier pay
dividends if less debt is outstanding. Thus, increasing 8(t) raises
E)+i and hence raises ES+i.
The solution for the optimal debt issue in any period depends upon the
firm's current and future expected state. If the firm is currently paying
dividends and is expected to do so in the future (— ES+i—0)
thensince the term on the first line in square brackets is positive, the
debt constraint is binding: p >0.Dividendsare a residual in this case
and will vary perfectly with earnings. Suppose on the other hand that the
firm may find the zero-dividend constraint binding in period t+l ,butthe
A
dividendconstraint today is not binding if it issues B in debt. From
assuiMption vi, the term in square brackets on the second line is positive, so
the firm will issue less than maximum debt, reducing 8(t) until is
positive, i.e. dividends are zero. (Because current earnings and required
debt repayments are given, the reduction in debt issued amounts to a
reduction in current dividends.) If earnings are great enough today, and
expected to be very low next period, it is possible that the firm may
optimally invest in marketable debt securities in order to reduce the need to32
issue equity in the future.
In general, Et&t+l depends on B(t) and (A3) can be satisfied
without being at a zero dividend corner solution. The tax advantage to debt
is a weighted average of the square bracketed terms in the first and second
lines of (A.8), where the weights depend on current and expected future cash
20
flow.
As a final point, suppose that the firm is currently issuing equity.
Then > 0 and from (A.6) the shadow price of debt rises. Thus, if there
were a gradually increasing marginal cost to debt issues (rather than an
assumed debt capacity), the firm would issue additional debt before issuing
equity.
This model makes several points:
1.There is a financing hierarchy generated by taxes.Profitable
firms pay dividends and issue debt. The least profitable firms pay no
dividends, issue debt, and issue equity. Dividends are the marginal source
of finance for firms which have high cash flow both now and in the future,
and equity issues are a last resort.
2. Despite the assumption that there is a tax advantage to debt, firms
will not always hit the debt capacity constraint. In particular, if there is
a significant chance of a future equity issue, it may be optimal to reduce
debt or even hold positive amounts of debt (financial slack) in lieu of
paying dividends so as to reduce the chance of a future equity issue.
3. Firms which have low cash flow today reduce dividends and (if
possible) issue additional debt before issuing equity.
4. Firms which are expected to have low cash flow in the future will
reduce debt and cut dividends in order to avoid future equity issues.33
APPENDIX B: DETAILS OF THE TWO-STEP ESTIMATION PROCEDURE21




where X and Z are vectors of explanatory variables. Assume that u, ,and
£2 are joint normally distributed with covariance matrix
2a a a u lu 2u
(B.3) a a12
2
Let and denote the cumulative normal density and the normal density:
—prob(u< Z-y)prob(regime 1) and (Z-y) —thestandard normal






Equation(B.4) may be estimated in the following way. First, estimate the
parameters,-y ,inequation (B.l) using probit, thus providing an estimate
;.(;)and (;) are then constructed using .LetY. be a dunimy34
variable which takes on the value 1 when Zy >uand 0 otherwise. Also
let diag[x] be the n x n diagonal matrix with x on the ith diagonal, and








The third term in the error arises because the true state is either 0 or 1,
A
but the instrumented variable, 'isgenerally different from zero or one.
The last two terms reflect estimation error in the 'and terms.
Computing the covariance matrix thus requires characterizing the estimation
error resulting from the probit estimation. Using results in Maddala (1983,





and-y --yasymptotically has the same distribution as
(3.7) (Z'Z) Z'diag[./(.(l-.))] Col[(Y-.)]
where W —diag[ / (.(l -.)) ]. Alsolet











+[H÷ C CH -(a2 -cl)CF} Z(Z'I'Z)1WC1 ]diag[(Y.
-
Using(3.8) together with the fact (Maddala, p. 254) that
A A A
(3.9) Var( -y )— E((-i--y) (y-'y)' }
—E((Z'WZ)1Z'C1Col[Y. -'Z.]Col[Y. -U'C1WZ(Z'Z)1)
—(Z't'ZY1










Note that in constructing it is necessary to obtain estimates of the
elements of the covariance matrix (8.3), as well as estimates of .and
y. Theprocedure for estimating a and a2is as follows. First,




Theterm is included to correct for sample selection bias (since only
observations for which u < Z-y are used in the estimation) and its
coefficient is an estimate of .Similarly,for observations for which u
> Z-y run the regression
(B.9b) —X2+ a2 +
an estimate of a2 .Finally,given the estimates of
and 2 a1 and a2 can be estimated as in Lee and
be the fitted residual tD -X31from estimating
he fitted residual D - fromestimating (B.9b).











(B.9a) and £2 be
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Table 1
Industry Membership of Sam1e Firms
(n —423)
2 Digit SIC Industry name Number of
Range Firms
10-19 Metal, Oil and Construction 28
20-29 Textiles, Paper, Chemicals and Petroleum Refining 115
30-39 General Industrial, Rubber, Plastics, Glass, 192
Cement, Steel, Machinery, Electrical and Computing
40-49 Transportation, Communication, Electrical and 34
Gas Services
50-59 Wholesale and Retail 40
70-79 Lodging and Services 10




Market Value market value of equity +currentliab. +long-termdebt.
(from Balance Sheet)
Earnings operating income gross of depreciation
Std. Dev. of Oper. standard deviation of (change in operating income
Income /assets) where operating income is gross of
depreciation and assets is the book value of
assets. Calculated with no fewer than eight and no
more than 10 years of data preceding each year,
depending on data availablilty. (from Balance
Sheet)
Lagged Return lagged annual stock return.
Debt (short-term debt in current liabilities +long-term
debt). (from Balance Sheet)
External Equity sales of Common and Preferred Stock less purchases of
Financing Common and Preferred. (from Statement of Changes)
External Debt Sales of long-term debt less reductions in long-term
Financing debt +changein debt in current liabilities. (from
Statement of Changes and Balance Sheet)
Total External external debt financing +externalequity financing.
Financing










5. External Equity Financing/Market Value
.067 .071
6. External Debt Financing/Market Value
.212 .164




SummaryStatistics for Sample Firms
RangeStatistics
Range Overall





























Average number of zero dividend years:
Average number of dividend changes:
2.64 out of 14 years
9.18 out of 14 years43
Table 4
ESTIMATES OF SIMPLE DIVIDEND EQUATION
Dependent Variable: Div -Div(-l) (Div-Div(-l))/P(-l)











1A11 variables but r(-1) are divided by the lagged stock price.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Number of Observations: 4018 (287 firms) for fixed effects estimates, 4018
for equation (16) estimates.44
Table 5
First Stage Probit Regressions
1 2












STD DEV OPERATING INCOME -0.5614 0.9498
(1.057) (1.088)
Number of Equity Issues: 261 226
Standard Errors in parentheses. Number of observations4018.
1Dependent variable is 1 if firm reported positive external equity financing,
0 otherwise. Swaps count as an equity issue.
2Dependent variable is 1 if firm reported positive external equity financing










of and terms, 5 d.f.): 204.00
Standard Errors in parentheses. Number
1A
A
and are constructed using the
previous table. Swaps count as equity
2 and are constructed using the





















































case 2 probit regressions in the
equity issues.46
Table 7a
Swnmary of Parameter Estimates
Logit Analysis of Dividend Changes
(n —4018)
Explanatory Coeffic ienta Coefficientb
Variable for dividend for dividend
increases Decreases
Lagged Dividend .1486 .4881
Yield (.0176) (.0273)







Market Value (.0042) (.0053)
Market Value .2271 .1177
(.0253) (.0422)
Market Value/ .0017 .0000
Total Assets (.0011) (.0027)




Standard errors in parentheses.
aposjtive values indicate that an increase in the explanatory variable would
ncrease the probability of an increase in equity
Positive values indicate that an increase in the explanatory variable would
increase the probability of a decrease in equity47
Table 7b
Elasticities of Parameter Estimates
Logit Analysis of Dividciid Changes
(n —4018)
Explanatory Elasticity Elasticity
Variable for dividend for dividend
increases decreases
(std error/mean) (std error/mean)
Lagged Dividend .908 1.364
Yield (.005) (.008)







Market Value (.000) (.000)
Market Value .891 .380
(.004) (.007)
Market Value! .040 -.020
Total Assets (.000) (.000)
Std. Dev. of Oper. -.601 .541
Income (.003) (.005)48
Table 8a
Summary of Parater Estimates
Logit Analysis of Equity Changes
Swaps counted as equity increases
(n —4018)
Explanatory Coefficienta Coefficientb
Variable for equity for equity
increases decreases
(standard error) (standard error)
Lagged Dividend -.0563 -.1329
Yield (.0275) (.0370)







Market Value (.0053) (.0075)
Market Value .1557 .0325
(.0426) (.0545)
Market Value/ -.0181 -. 957
Total Assets (.0065) (.0221)




apositive values indicate that an jpcrease in theexplanatory variable would
increase the probability of an increase in equity
Positive values indicate that an increasc in the explanatory variable would
increase the probability of a decrease in equity49
Table 8b
Elasticities of Parameter Estimates
Logit Analysis of Equity Changes
Swaps counted as equity increases
(n —4018)
Explanatory Elasticity Elasticity
Variable for equit, for equity
increases decreases
(std err'r/mean) (std error/mean)
Lagged Dividend .017 -.371
Yield (.008) (.09)








Market Value (.000) (.000)
Market Value .828 -.477
(.007) (.009)
Market Value/ -.268 -2.592
Total Assets (.000) (.001)
Std. Dev. of Oper. .147 -.086
Income (.005) (.008)50
FOOTNOTES
1. One possible resolution of this puzzle is simply that firms are
prohibited by the IRS from regularly repurchasing significant amounts of
shares. We know of no evidence either way on this question.
2. Both are single period models for which a dynamic extension is
nontrivial, and neither permits debt issues as an alternative form of
finance. Bhattacharya [1979] has the firm commit to a dividend which it pays
after earnings are revealed. Firms with cash flow less than the announced
dividend issue equity, and firms with high cash flow pay out any surplus.
This payout is not a dividend, since it is not taxed, and is costless, unlike
share issues. The empirical difficulty is that share issues and repurchases
are rare events, and incorporating debt in the model is a non-trivial
extension. In John and Williams [1985] dividends are paid by firms with
temporarily low cash flow, which contradicts empirical dividend studies.
Miller and Rock [1985] also develop a signalling model, but it pertains to
net external cash flow rather than to dividends specifically.
3. Fama and Babiak varied the lag structure in the Lintner model, and tested
the different specifications for predictive ability. Marsh and Merton
included the stock price as an explanatory variable on the grounds that it
should incorporate information about future earnings. While this is not
exactly the Lintner model, it is very much in the same spirit.
4. Baxter and Cragg (1971), Taub (1976), and Marsh (1982) all used bivariate
discrete choice estimation methods to study corporate financial policies.
Uhier and Cragg (1971) used multinomial logit to study asset choice by households.51
5. Marsh [1982] contains a comprehensive review of the literature on debt-
equity choice. More recent work includes including Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim
[1984], Jali1vaxd and Harris [1984], and MacKie-Mason [1986].
6. An exception is Cragg and Baxter (1970), who use probit to study the
decision to issue long-term securities versus the alternative of no issue.
7. Ofer and Thakor (1986) develop a model in which managers affect their own
portfolio through choice of firm financial policy and sometimes employ
dividends as a signal and sometimes repurchases.
8.In a study of bank capital structure decisions, Marcus [1981] accounts for
the difference between passive and active capital structure changes.
9. For an explicit empirical implementation of this idea, see Jalilvand and
Harris (1984).
10. It is necessary to include debt as a choice variable in such a model to
obtain interesting dynamics. In a multiperiod model the alternative to
payments to shi.reholders is a change in investment policy. Since real
investment opportunities are likely to be limited, investments in marketable
financial assets are the feasible alternative. Allowing the firm to invest
in financial assets in positive or negative quantities is the same as
allowing a choice of debt ratio.
11. If there is a tax advantage to issuing debt, one would think that there
should be a tax disadvantage to the firm's holding debt as an asset; this is
one of the points made in Miller (1985). One of the interesting conclusions
from the tax model, however, is that the "tax advantage to debt" is not an
unvarying number, but depends upon the current and expected future
profitability of the fiim. It is entirely possible that debt issues are52
sometimes tax advantaged and other times tax disadvantaged. See Auerbach
[1984]
12. This assumes that repurchases are limited. There is no satisfactory
theory of repurchases, but dividends cannot be explained in a tax model
unless repurchases are limited.
13. In Bhattacharya's [1979] example with earnings distributed uniformly
(pp. 263-66), the probability that earnings will be below the announced
dividend is independent of expected earnings, and hence independent of the
announced dividend. Thus, high dividend firms would be as likely to issue
equity as would low dividend firms. This result, however, appears to depend
on the particular assumed distribution (uniform) for earnings.
l4.Estimation of the switching regression model was performed using RATS on
an IBM 4361 mainframe. The effective limit for total observations, including
all variables and constructed intermediate variables in the estimation, was
about 100,000 data points. Estimation of the multinomial Logit model was
performed using QUAIL on a Cyber mainframe.
15.It is well documented that the debt-equity ratio varies over time in the
aggregate. See McDonald [1983] and Taggart [1985].
l6.The results we use are that, if u and are joint normally
distributed, then




17.It should be noted that in the Lintner model the coefficient on earnings
should be the target payout ratio, which is about .4, times the speed of
adjustment coefficient. Thus, given our low estimates of the speed of
adjustment, the earnings coefficient measured when returns are not in the
equation is approximately correct.
18. One possible explanation for the different coefficients is that earnings
were noisier in the 1970's than in the 1950's. Dividends could appear less
responsive to earnings changes, even if equally responsive to "true"
earnings.
19. Aharony and Swary [1980] find that 87% of firms do not change dividends
in a typical quarter, which is comparable to our findings using annual data.
20. A similar point is made in Edwards and Keen (1984) in a comment on
Auerbach (1979).
21. Thederivationhere closely follows that in Maddala, Lee, and Trost (1978).
22.This expression for the covariance matrix of the errors differs slightly
from that in Lee, Maddala, and Trost [1978], in that it omits two terms. In












































































































































































































































































































































































































































1971 1975 1979 1983
YEAR

























0 123456789 10 11 12 13 14
NUMBEROFCHANGES
DECREASE NOCHANGE INCREASE